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 Non-technical summary 
Investing in innovation is a highly uncertain endeavour. Therefore, a common approach to 
mitigating the high risk of failure of a single project is to establish a portfolio of innovation 
projects and to select the most promising when implementing them. In the following, we 
investigate which types of experience generated by previous innovation projects could 
possibly improve firms’ ability to judge the prospects of innovation projects’ success and 
thereby identify and discard the less favourable opportunities.  
We combine the insights of two management approaches: learning and selectionism (Loch 
et al, 2008; Pich et al, 2002), as discussed in the literature, to factor in environmental 
uncertainty in order to uncover the effects of previous innovation experiences on project 
selection. The first approach is one of trial and error. The information signals emerging from 
the different projects are used to update expectations of project success and environmental 
development. The selectionism approach, on the other hand, suggests dealing with 
environmental uncertainty by running multiple projects simultaneously. The insights of these 
management approaches are echoed, respectively, in economics in the theoretical concepts of 
“real options” and “absorptive capacity” rationale. These concepts are used to derive two 
major learning mechanisms from previous innovation experience. 
The existence of a portfolio of projects leads us directly to the real options rationale. Based 
on this approach, we derive one learning mechanism from previous innovation experience. A 
single project is considered an option in the sense that it provides the firm with a right but not 
the obligation to pursue it further. Thus, the decision as to whether or not to complete the 
innovation projection can be postponed. The management recommendations delivered by the 
selections approach can be based on the theoretical premises of this concept. A learning 
mechanism is also derived from these premises. As the real options concept is derived from 
financial pricing models, the necessary information for deriving the value of individual 
projects, and therefore evaluating and deciding whether to pursue them or not, are the 
financial features of the innovation project. Thus, previous investments in innovation should 
increase the ability of firms to judge potential projects in terms of their economic feasibility. 
The absorptive capacity literature, on the other hand, suggests learning from previous 
innovation experience - or more specifically, R&D experience - thus improving firms’ ability 
to identify, assimilate and exploit external knowledge. The absorptive capacity of a firm 
therefore describes its ability to process external information signals, and this ability enables 
the firm to predict future technological and market trends more accurately. This is similar to 
updating expectations about future developments in the trial and error management approach. 
Based on this comprehensive knowledge base, previous innovation experience enhances 
firms’ ability to judge innovation projects in terms of their knowledge requirements and to 
decide on this basis whether to pursue them or not. 
We test for the existence of these different learning mechanisms of innovation experience 
for judging the likelihood of project success empirically on the basis of data from the 
 Mannheim Innovation Panel. First, we analyse the project selection criteria reported by 
surveyed heads of R&D departments and investigate whether the observed reasons for 
abandoning or not starting innovation projects reflect the underlying constructs of the learning 
mechanisms or the judgement of projects on the basis of economic feasibility or knowledge 
requirements. The analysis of principal component factors confirms our theoretical reasoning 
as we obtain two distinct factors representing two distinct dependence structures among the 
possible reasons for not further pursuing the innovation project. The first - hereinafter referred 
to as the economic factor - represents the dependence between selection reasons based solely 
on financial considerations, eg lack of external funding. The second - hereinafter referred to 
as the knowledge factor - represents the dependence between selection reasons based solely 
on judging projects in terms of knowledge requirements, e. g. lack of market or technological 
information. These two distinct dependence structures thus confirm the existence of the two 
learning mechanisms that we derived theoretically above. 
We conduct an econometric analysis subsequently, in order to reveal which type of 
experience is actually generated by previous innovation experience. Thereby, the 
(orthogonalised and rescaled) principal component factors serve as instruments for the two 
types of experience generated. Our results indicate congruence between firms’ innovation 
experience and their project selection patterns. Previous innovation experience, measured by 
lagged innovation intensities, appears to have a positive and significant impact on project 
selection based on economic factors. However, there are no such effects with respect for the 
knowledge factor. The effect holds once we split innovation expenditure into R&D and later-
stage innovation expenditure as different types of innovation expenditure in different phases 
of the innovation process should produce different kinds of feedback experience. This is also 
reflected in our regression results when we split all innovation expenditure into R&D and 
non-R&D expenditure. Thus, R&D expenditure, as investments in absorptive capacity, 
enhances firms’ ability to judge projects in terms of their knowledge requirements and non-
R&D, whereas later-stage innovation expenditure are reflected in project selection based on 
economic factors. 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
Aufwendungen für Innovationsaktivitäten sind für die durchführenden Unternehmen mit 
einem hohen betriebswirtschaftlichen Risiko verbunden. Unternehmen diversifizieren deshalb 
üblicherweise das Risiko über verschiedene Innovationsprojekte. Im Zeitablauf sollten 
demnach Projekte, die sich als wenig erfolgversprechend erweisen, selektiert werden. Ziel 
dieses Diskussionsbeitrags ist die Analyse, ob Erfahrungen aus bereits implementierten 
Innovationen sich in der Fähigkeit des Unternehmens niederschlagen, die Erfolgsaussichten 
einzelner Projekte zu eruieren, die wenig erfolgversprechenden zu identifizieren und diese 
somit aus dem Projektportfolio zu selektieren.  
Um mögliche Mechanismen zu identifizieren, wie sich Innovationserfahrung auf die 
Selektion von Projekten auswirkt, greifen wir zunächst auf die Managementansätze ‚learning’ 
und ‚selectionism’ zum Umgang mit inhärenter Unsicherheit zurück. Die Implikationen der 
beiden Managementansätze, nämlich der Risikodiversifikation über verschiedene Projekte 
bzw. der permanenten Aktualisierung der Informationsbasis, spiegeln sich auch in den 
theoretischen Konstrukten der ‘real options’ und der ‘absorptive capacity’ wider. Diese 
werden wir für die Herleitung potentieller Lernmechanismen zur Selektion von 
Innovationsprojekten heranziehen.  
Einzelne Innovationsprojekte können zum einen als Option betrachtet werden, im dem 
Sinne, dass ein Recht erworben wird sich in dem jeweiligen technologischen Feld weiter zu 
engagieren. Da damit aber keine Verpflichtung zur Fortführung des Projekts einhergeht und 
sich der Wert dieser Option aus finanziellen Daten der Investitionsrechnung ergibt, impliziert 
dieser Theoriestrang, dass potentielle Lerneffekte aus früherer Innovationstätigkeit aus der 
verbesserten Fähigkeit resultieren, Projekte unter dem Blickwinkel finanzieller Machbarkeit 
zu evaluieren, und damit zu selektieren.  
Auf der anderen Seite ist mit Innovations- (bzw. dabei insbesondere FuE-) Tätigkeiten auch 
ein Aufbau absorptiver Fähigkeiten verbunden, d. h. einer verbesserten Fähigkeit externes 
Wissen zu erkennen, zu integrieren und nutzbar zu machen. Da somit durch bereits 
implementierte Innovationen c. p. mehr potentielle externe Wissensquellen identifiziert 
worden sind. Dies erleichtert die Evaluation von Innovationsprojekten auf Basis des, für deren 
Fortführung benötigten Wissens, welches technologischer Art oder Wissen über 
Marktgegebenheiten sein kann. 
Auf Basis des Mannheimer Innovationspanels untersuchen wir empirisch ob bzw. welche 
Lerneffekte sich bezügl. der Selektion von Innovationsprojekten nachweisen lassen. Dazu 
analysieren wir zunächst die Struktur der Hemmnisfaktoren von denen die befragten Leiter 
der FuE-Abteilungen angeben, dass sie zu einem Abbruch oder zu einer Einstellung des 
Innovationsprojekts bereits in der Konzeptionsphase geführt haben. Es zeigt sich, dass die 
zwei oben theoretisch postulierten Lernmechanismen sich auch empirisch widerspiegeln. In 
einer Hauptkomponentenanalyse kristallisieren sich zwei disjunkte Abhängigkeitsstrukturen 
zwischen den potentiellen Selektionsmotiven heraus. Unternehmen selektieren demnach 
 Innovationsprojekte entweder aus dem Blickwinkel der finanziellen Machbarkeit oder aus 
dem Blickwinkel fehlenden Wissens bzw. Kenntnisse aus. Diese (orthogonalisierten und 
normierten) Faktoren der Hauptkomponentenanalyse dienen uns dann als Instrumente für die 
zwei Arten potentieller Lernmechanismen. Sie bilden dann unsere abhängige Variable in einer 
Regression, um zu zeigen welche Lerneffekte aus früherer Innovationstätigkeit tatsächlich 
resultieren. Es zeigt sich, dass Erfahrungen aus vergangenen Innovationsprojekten, abgebildet 
durch die zeitverzögerten Innovationsintensitäten der Unternehmen, einen signifikant 
positiven Einfluss auf die Selektion von Projekten  aus finanzwirtschaftlichen Beweggründen 
aufweisen. Frühere Innovationstätigkeit hat dabei keinen Effekt auf die Selektion wenig 
erfolgversprechender Projekte auf Grund fehlenden Wissens oder Kenntnisse. Ein 
differenzierteres Bild zeigt sich, wenn man die Innovationstätigkeit entlang verschiedener 
Stufen des Innovationsprozesses differenziert (d. h. zwischen grundlagenorientierter FuE-
Tätigkeit und anwendungsbezogener Innovationstätigkeit). Aufwendungen für FuE erhöhen 
demnach, als Investitionen in die absorptive Kapazität, die Fähigkeit Innovationsprojekte auf 
Basis des, für deren Fortführung benötigten Wissens und Kenntnisse zu evaluieren. 
Aufwendungen für die nachfolgenden Stufen des Innovationsprozesses sind demgegenüber 
mit einem Erfahrungsgewinn in der Evaluation der finanziellen Machbarkeit verbunden ist. 
Verschiedene Stufen des Innovationsprozesses generieren somit auch unterschiedliche 
Erfahrungen. 
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1 Introduction 
Generating competitive advantage through the continuous introduction of new products, 
services and processes is the core challenge for most firms in modern economies. However, 
the recipe for successful innovation activities remains unclear. 40% to 90% of new products 
fail (depending on category), and this rate has remained relatively stable over the last 25 years 
(Gourville, 2006). Hence, innovation engagements remain an uncertain endeavour, ie the odds 
of success are difficult if not impossible to predict. Most firms tackle this issue by engaging in 
multiple innovation projects so that they have a broad spectrum of possible solutions. This 
approach implies that they are able to set priorities and select the most promising options once 
the odds of success or failure become visible and reliable. 
Most research in the field focuses on the technological options that have actually 
materialised as new products or processes, partly because they are traceable through patent 
applications or sales numbers. We add to this body of literature by arguing that an important 
part of picking the winning projects lies in a firm’s ability to identify and discard less 
favourable innovation opportunities. The latter enables firms to concentrate scarce resources 
once probabilities for success or failure have emerged. More precisely, we explore the type of 
knowledge firms generate from previous investments in innovation activities that enables 
them to decide on which projects not to pursue or no longer to pursue. We develop the 
hypotheses based on two streams of literature: real options theory and absorptive capacity 
research. We suggest that learning from previous investments in innovation reduces 
uncertainties deriving from economic factors and/or knowledge deficits. Both should be 
reflected in a firm’s project selection. Furthermore, we argue that both the stage of innovation 
activities (R&D activities vs activities close to market introduction) and the related learning 
experience influence the selection criteria. We test these hypotheses empirically for more than 
750 German firms and their innovation activities between 1997 and 2005. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides our theoretical 
framework on uncertainty and project selection, followed by the hypotheses development. 
Section 4 outlines the empirical study while section 5 presents the results. We conclude by 
discussing them in section 6 and providing an outlook on future research. 
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2 Uncertainty in innovation activities and project selection 
Innovation activities are investments in the future and therefore the outcome is uncertain, ie 
it is dependent on changes in the environment and the perception of the initial state of the 
environment. Evaluating individual innovation projects is challenging because of dynamic 
opportunities, project interdependencies, multiple goals and strategy considerations, 
unreliable or changing information and multiple decision makers (Cooper et al., 2001). There 
is a variety of definitions, constructs and subsequent measures of the dimensions of 
uncertainty. Knight (1921) provides a basic definition of uncertainty as the absence of 
probability distributions, ie no probabilities on multiple outcomes in a certain situation can be 
calculated. This stream of literature focuses on the lack of information on the environment 
and causal relationships (eg Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) as a cause of uncertainty. Hence, 
traditional risk management methods do not apply. Innovation success depends on the 
complex interplay between the actions undertaken by firms and the state of the environment 
(Loch et al, 2008; Pich et al, 2002). Managers are typically unaware of many potential 
influential factors at the beginning of the innovation process. As these factors are unknown, 
nothing to say of their “sample realisation” during the innovation process, they cannot be 
incorporated in the risk management of the innovation process. 
The major goal of our analysis is to focus on how firms deal with uncertainty in their 
innovation activities. Literature suggests two general approaches: selectionism and learning 
(Loch et al, 2008; Pich et al, 2002). The learning perspective suggests a flexible approach of 
trial and error in which firms set expectations but are constantly ready and willing to update 
and change them once signals emerge that they are not in line with reality (see, for example, 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; O'Connor and Veryzer, 2001). However, selectionism 
implies that firms pursue multiple options simultaneously and accept that some will 
eventually fail. McGrath, 2001 describes this process as “variance seeking” instead of “mean 
seeking” for new opportunities. Such a portfolio of innovation projects allows firms facing an 
uncertain environment to balance individual risks, align innovation engagements with the 
overall business strategy and maximise the returns on R&D spending (Cooper et al, 2001). 
Our goal is to extend this existing literature by combining the perspectives of learning and 
selectionism. The management of innovation portfolios under uncertainty is a dynamic 
decision process built around evaluating, selecting and prioritising projects so that resources 
can be efficiently allocated (Cooper et al, 2001). Management literature has to a large extent 
dealt with the issue from the perspective of how quantitative and/or qualitative tools can 
facilitate the management of innovation portfolios given the uncertainty challenges (see, for 
example, Copeland and Tufano, 2004; Maher and Rubenstein, 1974 and Heidenberger and 
Stummer, 1999 for a comprehensive review). However, relatively little is known about how 
experience from previous innovation initiatives shapes a firm’s project selection. We aim at 
contributing to the literature by assessing the value of these previous learning engagements in 
relation to a firm’s decision to reject or discontinue projects, ie to weed bad projects out of 
their portfolio. 
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3 Hypotheses development 
We explore two streams of literature - real options theory and absorptive capacity research - 
to capture the potential effects of learning from previous innovation engagements on current 
project selection theoretically. 
3.1 Investments in innovation activities as real options 
“The valuation of investments in R&D projects is a crucial topic in R&D management” 
(Perlitz et al, 1999: 255) is the opening line of the paper by Perlitz et al which discusses the 
application of the real options evaluation method to innovation and R&D activities. The real 
options method is based on financial option pricing models (Black and Scholes, 1973). Real 
options are sequential, irreversible investments in real assets made under uncertainty (Adner 
and Levinthal, 2004; Pindyck, 1991) and provide firms with the right but not the obligation to 
pursue certain actions in the future (Folta and O'Brien, 2004). Since the real options approach 
is tailored to deal with the uncertainty involved in investment decisions and projects 
(Trigoergis, 1997), its application to R&D and innovation projects involving high levels of 
uncertainty is not surprising. Investments in innovation activities produce real options for 
dealing with environmental dynamics through the build-up of internal capabilities and 
knowledge stocks. By holding a real option, a firm secures only its access to a given 
innovation project in the future. Innovation projects typically require substantial investments, 
but holding the comparatively cheap option enables the firm to postpone its decision to 
undertake a project. Own internal innovation and R&D activities may therefore function like 
an insurance policy in the sense that firms can reduce their overall exposure to uncertainty by 
holding several real options. Similar to the rational logic behind financial options, real options 
can serve as a method of reducing the risk of substantial losses for a given financial return 
(Perlitz et al, 1999). Options can take different forms which can be exercised if the innovation 
and R&D projects do not develop as expected (see Perlitz et al, 1999 for an excellent review). 
These options include, among other things, stopping a project completely, putting a project on 
hold to wait for new information or reducing the size of the project (see, for example, Kester, 
1984, Trigeorgis, 1993). 
A real options portfolio presents a method of insurance against the uncertainty involved in 
R&D projects if project evaluations are constantly updated and refined. Perlitz et al (1999) 
present a detailed review of the different ingredients needed to come up with a valuation of a 
given R&D project based on option pricing models like the binominal model or the Black-
Scholes model. The necessary elements are the exercise price, the time to expiration, the risk 
involved, the dividend payment, and the risk less interest rate. All these factors are clearly 
related to economic or, to be more precise, financial features of an R&D project. Thus the 
more R&D and innovation projects a firm undertakes, the more experience and points of 
reference it should have for evaluating these projects with regard to their economic feasibility. 
We therefore derive: 
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Hypothesis 1: Previous investments in innovation increase the ability of firms to judge 
potential projects in terms of their economic feasibility. 
3.2 Investments in absorptive capacity as uncertainty-reducing instruments 
Investments in R&D not only generate real option-related learning experience, ie they not 
only clarify economic factors. A different but related stream of research sees R&D 
investments’ primary benefit as the ability to acquire new knowledge and technologies. As 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989; 1990) have shown, they increase firms’ absorptive capacity. 
Absorptive capacity consists of three elements (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990): The 
identification of valuable knowledge in the environment, its assimilation in existing 
knowledge stocks and finally its exploitation for successful innovation. Absorptive capacities, 
their roots, mechanisms and consequences have been an extensive part of recent scientific 
discussions (Lane et al, 2006 have 289 papers in their excellent review). High absorptive 
capacities enable firms to engage in exploratory innovation activities through unpredictable or 
rare combinations of existing technology or knowledge (Jansen et al, 2006; Subramaniam and 
Youndt, 2005). They also provide the basis for reinforcing, complementing or refocusing a 
firm’s knowledge base (Lane et al, 2006). Investments in absorptive capacities give them 
access to a rich set of diverse knowledge which provides firms with more choices to solve 
problems and to react to environmental changes (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; March, 1991). 
Zahara and George (2002) introduce the distinction between potential and realised absorptive 
capacity. In essence, they imagine absorptive capacity to be the interplay of organisational 
processes for bringing a broad range of diverse ideas into the firm, which are subsequently 
narrowed down, prioritised and codified to facilitate efficient assimilation, and exploitation 
processes (Jansen et al, 2005). Cohen and Levinthal (1994) suggest that absorptive capacities 
enable firms to predict future developments more accurately. Continuous learning 
engagements increase awareness for market and technology trends which can be translated 
into pre-emptive action. Firms may discover new and previously concealed challenges as their 
internal capacities for identifying, evaluating and developing them expand. 
In summary, firms with high absorptive capacities are better able to assess the knowledge 
requirements of potential projects because they have a more comprehensive overview of 
potential knowledge sources and availability. What is more, they are experienced in 
evaluating the potential contributions of external knowledge for their internal innovation 
processes. Building on these arguments we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 2: Investments in innovation activities increase the ability of firms to judge 
projects in terms of their knowledge requirements. 
3.3 Investments at different stages of the innovation process 
The chain-linked model of innovation developed by Kline and Rosenberg (1986) is built 
around distinct stages of the innovation process. They distinguish between an invention phase, 
a redesign and production phase, and a distribution and market phase. Research of different 
kinds is a necessary ingredient for each phase. The OECD and Eurostat both acknowledge 
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that the innovation process involves various steps and phases by writing “The point to be 
noted […] is that innovation is a complex, diversified activity with many interacting 
components […]“ (OECD/Eurostat, 1997). Analogous to the different phases, different types 
of investments in innovation activities are necessary. The literature on input into the 
innovation process is a good way of illustrating this point. Felder et al (1996), for example, 
argue that, although expenditure on research and development is an important element of 
input for the process of developing innovative products or projects, it is not the only one. 
They, as well as Grupp (1997), make the case that other investments in innovation activities, 
such as expenditure on the acquisition of technology, licences or patents, which is necessary 
for the innovation process, also constitute important elements of input. These elements could 
still be expenditure in the early phases of innovation processes and are most often linked to 
R&D activities. They all relate to access to relevant and complementary knowledge. The later 
phases of the innovation process, ie distribution and marketing of innovative products or the 
introduction of innovative processes in the firm also require substantial investments that go 
beyond R&D investments. These investments are particularly relevant for sectors of the 
economy not relying on internal R&D extensively, ie service industries and small 
manufacturing firms in certain industries (see, for example, Kleinknecht, 1987; Pavitt et al, 
1989; Hipp and Grupp, 2005). Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1997) show that the innovation 
activities close to the market do influence the success of innovations and are not covered by 
R&D expenditure. The Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) of the member states of the 
European Union take this into account by asking firms about R&D expenditure and non-R&D 
innovation expenditure, such as investments in the acquisition of machinery and equipment 
and external knowledge for innovation activities or for the market introduction of innovations 
(see OECD/Eurostat 1997). 
Different types of innovation expenditure in different phases of the innovation process 
should produce different kinds of feedback and add to the experience and lessons for a firm. 
We would therefore add an additional dimension to our previous hypotheses. We argue that 
technological R&D investments facilitate learning about technological opportunities or 
threats. This should be applied to project selection based on knowledge criteria. Innovation 
expenditure close to market introduction, however, provides lessons on market conditions and 
necessities. This experience should translate into project selection based on economic factors. 
Our formal hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 3a: Investments in R&D (early stages) increase the ability of firms to judge 
projects in terms of their knowledge requirements. 
Hypothesis 3b: Investments in non-R&D innovation activities (late stages) increase the 
ability of firms to judge potential projects in terms of their economic feasibility. 
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4 Empirical study 
4.1 Estimation strategy 
The main idea of our empirical set-up is to capture managers’ project selection criteria by 
observing the reasons why they either abandon ongoing innovation projects or do not start 
new ones. The assumption behind this approach is that firms reveal their preference for 
project evaluation - ie economic feasibility or knowledge requirements - in the reasons they 
give (out of a total of seven different options) for not starting or abandoning innovation 
projects. To provide an example by way of clarification: we assume that a firm stating high 
innovation costs as a reason for not starting innovation activities pays more attention to 
economic factors than a firm stating that a lack of technological knowledge is responsible for 
not starting innovation projects. Our estimation strategy has three major stages: 
 We investigate whether seven observed reasons for abandoning or not starting 
innovation projects reflect the underlying constructs of project selection based on 
economic or knowledge criteria. We perform confirmatory factor analyses for this 
purpose. The resulting factor scores serve as the dependent variables in all further 
investigations. 
 We relate innovation activities in previous time periods to the project selection 
constructs derived in the first step of the empirical analysis through regression 
analyses to test hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 We differentiate between R&D and non-R&D experiences in previous time periods 
and their effects on the project selection constructs derived in the first step of the 
empirical analysis through regression analyses to test hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
4.2 Data 
For the empirical part of this analysis, we use data from a survey on the innovation activities 
of German enterprises called the “Mannheim Innovation Panel” (MIP). The survey is 
conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of the 
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research1. The methodology and questionnaire 
used for the survey, which is targeted at enterprises with at least five employees, are 
harmonised with those used in the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), conducted every four 
years under the coordination of Eurostat. The method used for the German survey is stratified 
random sampling, with stratification by size, industry and region (eastern and western 
Germany). The questionnaire is based on the definitions and concepts of the OECD’s “Oslo 
Manual”. CIS surveys are self-reported and largely qualitative which raises quality issues with 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed description of the MIP surveys, see Janz et al (2001). For sample sizes and weighted 
figures for a variety of topics related to the innovation behaviour of German firms in the 2003 MIP, see 
Rammer et al (2005). 
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regard to administration, non-response and response accuracy (for a recent discussion, see 
Criscuolo et al, 2005). To tackle these quality issues, the following steps are taken: First, the 
CIS survey is administered via mail which prevents some of the shortcomings and biases of 
telephone interviews (for a discussion, see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). The 
multinational application of CIS surveys adds extra layers of quality management and 
assurance. CIS surveys are subject to extensive pre-testing and piloting in various countries, 
industries and firms with regard to interpretability, reliability and validity (Laursen and Salter, 
2006). Second, a comprehensive non-response analysis showed no systematic distortions 
between responding and non-responding firms with respect to their innovation activities. 
Third, the MIP questionnaire contains detailed definitions and examples to increase response 
accuracy. Longhand questions (eg “Please describe your most important product innovation 
briefly”) allow robustness checks for multiple choice answers. 
In conclusion, the major advantages of CIS surveys are that they provide direct, importance-
weighted measures for a comprehensive set of sources (Criscuolo et al, 2005). Heads of R&D 
departments or innovation managers are asked directly if and how they are able to generate 
innovations. This immediate information on processes and outputs can complement traditional 
measures for innovation such as patents (Grimpe and Sofka, 2008; Laursen and Salter, 2006). 
Our study represents such a case. The survey approach enables us to generate information on 
innovation projects that have not been started or were discarded. Moreover, it allows us to 
explore the reasons for this selection. 
The survey in Germany is conducted annually but the precise formulation of  questions 
varies. For consistency of questions, we use the surveys of 2005 and 2001 (as well as 1997 for 
lagged information). As a consequence, these two surveys cover half a decade of innovation 
activity. Each of these cross sections consists of about 5,000 observations. To achieve clarity 
in causal linkages, we use lagged values for investments in innovation activities. Each survey 
covers a three year reporting period which requires lagged information from the survey 
preceding it by 4 years. Hence, information is lagged from 2001 (for the survey of 2005) and 
1997 (for the survey of 2001). While this approach enables us to clarify causality, it restricts 
our sample to firms that have consistently responded to the survey with a four year time lag in 
between. Moreover, we limit our database to firms with successful innovation activities (ie 
having generated new products, services or processes) because a number of variables is only 
available for them. Hence, we can only observe differences between innovative firms, which 
should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. Both measures limit the number of 
available observations. For the following descriptive and inferential analysis, we narrow the 
dataset to a balanced, pooled cross section data set of 758 observations. 
4.3 Variables 
Dependent Variables 
According to Boyd et al (1993), a measure of the perceived importance of several possible 
factors is employed under uncertainty for project selection. Ideally, we would be able to trace 
each innovation project individually as well as the reasons for its rejection or cancellation. 
However, defining projects across firm and industry lines is difficult as hardly any objective 
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criteria exist. What is more, rejected projects may not even be treated as projects if they are 
rejected in early phases of the innovation process, such as  idea generation. Instead, we ask 
heads of R&D departments and innovation management departments about their overall 
perception of why innovation projects were rejected or cancelled at their company. While 
exceptions to these general assessments may exist, we are confident that we can cover the 
overall selection criteria of management. 
More precisely, respondents are requested to rate the importance of seven2 potential reasons 
for rejecting or cancelling projects on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from “not relevant” to 
“high.” The suggested items are: 
 High economic risk 
 High innovation costs 
 Lack of external funding 
 Organisational difficulties 
 Lack of qualified personnel 
 Lack of technological information 
 Lack of market information 
Obviously, these items are not independent of one another and it can be assumed that the 
heads of R&D departments consider a combination of factors before deciding on the future of 
a project. We therefore conduct a principal component factor analysis to identify underlying 
patterns. The analysis  goes well (Cronbach's alpha scale reliability coefficient: 0.81; Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.75) and we retain two factors with values of 
more than than 1. For content-related interpretation, we conduct an orthogonal varimax 
rotation. A likelihood ratio test confirms with an error probability of far below 1% that the 
two factors are independent, thus supporting the orthogonality assumption. (Kaiser and Rice, 
1974). Factor loadings characterise individual factors distinctively (above 0.7), as illustrated 
in Figure 1.  
                                                 
2  The actual number of items varies among CIS surveys. Typically, the list is extended. These seven items are 
consistently available for the timeframe of our analysis. The 4-point Likert scale is also standardised by CIS. 
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Figure 1: Selection criteria - factor loadings after varimax rotation 
0
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High economic risk
High innovation costs
Lack of external funding
Organisational difficultiesLack of qualified personnel
Lack of technological information
Lack of market information
Knowledge factor Economic factor  
Hence, we retain two distinct factors through confirmatory factor analysis which reflect our 
conceptual distinction between economic and knowledge factors. Factor 1 is defined by 
economic reasoning (economic risks, costs, funding). We will therefore refer to it as the 
“economic factor” for project rejection or cancellation. Factor 2 is characterised by 
knowledge deficits. Interestingly, there is no distinction between market and technological 
information (both variables have an individual correlation coefficient of 0.69). These paucities 
in knowledge should typically relate to a shortage of qualified personnel as the carriers of 
knowledge or difficulties in organising them. As a result, we will subsequently refer to factor 
2 as the “knowledge factor.” We score both factors based on the results of the factor analysis 
and retain a scale which reflects the intensity of each factor for each firm (rescaled between 
zero and one). 
We argue that the economic factor is closely related to the real options rationale laid out in 
Hypothesis 1. Selections based on economic risks, costs and financial sources would suggest 
reasoning based on financial considerations. The knowledge factor, though, is closer related to 
Hypothesis 2 which argues that previous innovation experience generates absorptive 
capacities that primarily translate into the ability to judge and acquire external knowledge. 
Hence, we use both factors as dependent variables in separate regression models to test our 
hypotheses. Factors are orthogonal to one another after varimax rotation, which makes 
ordinary least squares regressions most appropriate because no additional effects arise from 
formulating the estimation as a seemingly unrelated regression model. 
Independent variables of special interest 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) suggest that absorptive capacities are developed by performing 
R&D and that R&D investment can therefore capture their extent. We use multiple variables 
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to capture investments in absorptive capacities that are introduced to our structural model. 
First of all, the extent of investment in absorptive capacities is factored in as the sum of all 
innovation expenditure in a given year. As this variable is highly volatile, depending on the 
size of a firm, it is introduced in the empirical model as intensity, ie scaled by total sales. 
Absorptive capacity also depends on employees’ skills (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Rothwell 
and Dodgson, 1991), which are taken into account by the share of employees with higher 
education in our empirical model. However, absorptive capacities may not just depend on 
investments in a single year but on their accumulation over time (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Hence, we introduce a dummy variable indicating whether R&D activities are performed 
continuously over time. Additionally, innovation expenditure is broken down again into 
technological R&D and non-R&D innovation expenditure (eg investment in new machinery, 
market introduction and training related to innovation activities) as a share of sales in two 
additional regression models used to test our third hypothesis. Total sales figures and the 
different types of innovation expenditure for each firm, as well as the share of highly skilled 
employees, can be taken directly from questions in the questionnaire. 
In order to bypass possible simultaneity issues (it is possible that, contrary to our line of 
argumentation in the previous sub-section, high perceived innovation barriers result in high 
innovation expenditure), we use the panel structure of our dataset and introduce all variables 
as lagged variables. Each survey requests information about innovation activities in the 
preceding three years. Innovation expenditure, however, is only available for the end of the 
three year reference period. Hence, we apply a time lag of four years to achieve clarity in 
causal linkages and take these data restrictions into account. 
Control variables 
In order to control for other factors possibly influencing the dependent variables, subsequent 
variables are introduced in the structural model. Firms of different sizes adopt different 
organisational structures. These varying mediating filters lead to different outcomes of 
information processing, and, as a result, different conclusions are reached in the selection 
process. This is incorporated in the structural model by  entering the number of employees in 
logs.  We also account for the fact that the firm has applied for patents or received public 
funding for its innovation projects through separate dummy variables. Both factors could 
influence a firm’s uncertainty situation and therefore project selection. The effects of being 
part of a group, as well as a firm’s degree of internationalisation are taken into account 
separately (factored in through the share of exports in total sales). Dummy variables 
indicating regional effects (whether the firm is located in eastern Germany), period effects 
and remaining industry effects complete the structural model. The incorporated industry 
dummies take account of medium high-tech manufacturing, high-tech manufacturing, 
distributive, knowledge-intensive and technological services. The other manufacturing sector 
is the reference group. The Appendix provides a detailed industry classification. 
Descriptive statistics 
In table 1, we present some descriptive statistics for our sample. In order to identify 
differences between firms with high respective values for knowledge and economic factors 
and those with low values, we present descriptive statistics for firms with different values for 
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knowledge and economic factors. A straightforward way to group the firms is to use the 
median of the knowledge factor (0.353) and that of the economic factor (0.601)3 as the 
dividing line.  
The firms with high values for the respective factors are quite different to those with low 
values along several dimensions. With respect to the knowledge factors, most of the 
differences are due to factors that are not directly related to the innovation activities of firms. 
Firms with a high value for knowledge factors are more often located in western Germany and 
are on average larger than firms with low values for the knowledge factor. They also have a 
significantly higher share of exports in sales and are less likely to be in the distributive 
services or knowledge-intensive services industry. Some innovation activity indicators also 
differ significantly between firms with a high knowledge factor and those with low one. A 
larger share (66%) of the former are involved in continuous R&D activities than the latter 
(58%). For the group of firms with high values for the knowledge factor, we also find a higher 
share of firms assigning crucial importance to suppliers as a source of information than for 
those with lower values. Similarly, the share of firms applying for patent protection for their 
innovations is higher for the first group than for the second. In contrast, the share of firms that 
receive public funding is higher in the group of firms with knowledge factors below the 
median. 
The differences between firms with an above-median economic factor value and those with 
a sub-median economic factor value are even more pronounced than the knowledge factor 
split. One thing that sticks out is the difference with respect to the innovation intensity. Firms 
with above-median values for the economic factor spend a larger share of their turnover on 
innovation activities (both R&D and non-R&D) than the other half of the sample. They also 
have a larger share of employees with a university degree. The economic factor seems to be 
more important for firms with continuous R&D activities and those receiving public funding.  
Similar to the results for the knowledge factors, the firms forming the two groups of 
economic factor values differ with respect to more general firm characteristics like location in 
eastern Germany, share of exports in sales and size. The structure is reversed, however. While 
firms with high knowledge factor values are on average larger than their peers, firms with 
high economic factor values are on average smaller than firms with low values. Similarly, the 
share of eastern German firms is higher in the above-median group here, whereas it is lower 
for the high knowledge factor value group. The share of exports is lower for the sub-median 
group than for the above-median group when looking at the economic factors, and higher 
when looking at the knowledge factor group.  
The descriptive statistics indicate that institutional and environmental factors along with 
innovation-related activities influence the type of strategy a firm uses for evaluating potential 
projects. Institutional and environmental factors (eg size, location, exports) seem to be related 
to the choice or preference for one of the two methods of evaluating projects. 
                                                 
3 The firms on the median are included in the group labelled “above median” 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Knowledge 
factor above 
median 
Knowledge 
factor below 
median 
 Economic factor 
above median 
Economic 
factor below 
median 
 
Variable Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
 Mean Std 
dev 
Mean Std 
dev 
 
Innovation expenditure as share 
of sales (t-1) 
0.063 0.090 0.062 0.095  0.077 0.114 0.048 0.063 a
Non-R&D expenditure as share 
of sales (t-1) 
0.033 0.060 0.035 0.068  0.041 0.080 0.026 0.042 a
R&D expenditure as share of 
sales (t-1) 
0.030 0.060 0.063 0.097  0.035 0.072 0.022 0.044 a
Continuous R&D activity (t-1) 0.641 0.480 0.564 0.497 b 0.640 0.481 0.565 0.496 b
Share of employees with 
university degree (t-1) 
18.19 20.07 20.74 22.87  22.03 23.25 16.83 19.30 a
Customers as crucial 
information source (t-1) 
0.204 0.403 0.225 0.418  0.231 0.422 0.198 0.399  
Suppliers as crucial information 
source (t-1) 
0.181 0.385 0.114 0.318 b 0.164 0.371 0.130 0.337  
Competitors as crucial 
information source (t-1) 
0.038 0.191 0.023 0.151  0.035 0.183 0.027 0.161  
Research facilities as crucial 
information source (t-1) 
0.096 0.295 0.094 0.292  0.124 0.330 0.065 0.247 a
Patent protection 0.356 0.479 0.292 0.456 c 0.303 0.460 0.346 0.476  
Public funding 0.242 0.430 0.339 0.474 c 0.357 0.480 0.222 0.416 a
Part of conglomerate 0.510 0.501 0.459 0.499  0.484 0.500 0.485 0.501  
Location in eastern Germany 0.294 0.456 0.444 0.498 a 0.403 0.491 0.334 0.472 c
Share of exports of sales 0.219 0.253 0.175 0.239 b 0.170 0.226 0.225 0.264 a
No of employees (logs) 4.586 1.392 4.171 1.491 a 4.210 1.461 4.553 1.432 a
Year 2005 0.437 0.497 0.608 0.489 a 0.519 0.500 0.527 0.500  
Medium high-tech manuf 0.220 0.414 0.208 0.406  0.190 0.393 0.237 0.426  
High-tech manufacturing 0.082 0.274 0.064 0.247  0.086 0.281 0.059 0.236  
Distributive services 0.096 0.295 0.152 0.360 b 0.107 0.309 0.142 0.350  
Knowledge-intensive services 0.044 0.205 0.070 0.256  0.058 0.233 0.056 0.231  
Technological services 0.099 0.299 0.120 0.325  0.130 0.336 0.089 0.285 a
Knowledge factor 0.497 0.120 0.199 0.092 a 0.347 0.181 0.348 0.186  
Economic factor 0.590 0.189 0.565 0.255  0.761 0.105 0.389 0.144 a
No of observations 343 342  347 338  
Notes: a, b and c indicate significant differences of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, in means of the below-
median and above-median subsamples; the “above-median” group includes the median firms. In the case of the 
knowledge factors, there are 12 median firms, for economic factors 8. 
4.4 Empirical model and method 
We perform ordinary least-squares regression analyses to test the hypotheses. The formal 
model to test hypotheses 1 and 2 consists of the two following equations which are calculated 
independently of each other by means of OLS regressions: 
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t-1
0 1
t-1
t-1
0 1
t-1
total innovation expendituresS(economic factor) * βX
sales
total innovation expendituresS(knowledge factor) * X
sales
     
    
 
S(economic factor) is the scale that measures the importance of economic feasibility as a 
reason for firms abandoning or not starting innovation projects and S(knowledge factor) is the 
corresponding scale for the importance of knowledge deficits. X is the vector of control 
variables and  , are stochastic error terms. In order to be able to test our third hypothesis, we 
split up total innovation expenditure into  R&D and non-R&D innovation expenditure. With 
this modification, the two equations that make up the formal model for the third hypothesis 
are as follows. 
t-1 t-1
0 1 2
t-1 t-1
t-1 t-1
0 1 2
t-1 t-1
R&D expenditures non-R&D expendituresS(economic factor) * * X
sales sales
R&D expenditures non-R&D expendituresS(knowledge factor) * * X
sales sales
         
        
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5 Results 
The results of our least-squares estimation for the full sample of 685 firms are presented in 
Table 2 for Model I and Table 3 for Model II. The two equations for Model I contain total 
innovation expenditure as a share of sales in the preceding reporting period and factor in 
previous innovation experience. For the two equations in Model II, total innovation 
expenditure is split into two distinct categories - R&D expenditure and later-stage, non-R&D 
innovation expenditure. 
Table 2: Results of ordinary least-squares regression analysis on Model I (total 
innovation expenditure) 
 
Model I Economic factor Knowledge factor 
 Coef Std err Coef Std. err 
Innovation expenditure as share of sales (t-1) 0.236*** 0.077 0.107 0.082 
Non-R&D expenditure as share of sale (t-1)     
R&D expenditure as share of sales (t-1)     
Continuous R&D activity (t-1) † 0.053*** 0.021 0.026 0.017 
Share of employees with university degree (t-1) † 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
Part of company group† 0.008 0.018 0.014 0.015 
Location in eastern Germany† -0.036* 0.020 -0.052*** 0.016 
Share of exports in sales -0.120*** 0.041 -0.013 0.035 
No of employees (logs) -0.017** 0.008 0.013** 0.006 
Public funding for R&D† 0.068*** 0.021 -0.048*** 0.018 
Patent protection† -0.022 0.022 0.007 0.018 
Year 2005† -0.021 0.018 -0.067*** 0.014 
Medium high-tech manufacturing† 0.002 0.025 -0.006 0.020 
High-tech manufacturing† 0.009 0.038 0.003 0.029 
Distributive services† -0.036 0.029 -0.023 0.023 
Knowledge-intensive services† 0.006 0.04 -0.032 0.033 
Technological services† -0.033 0.038 0.011 0.032 
Constant 0.637*** 0.038 0.336*** 0.031 
Number of observations  685  685 
F (15, 669) 4.81 (15, 669) 5.93 
Prob > F  0.00  0.00 
R2  0.08  0.10 
Root MSE  0.22  0.18 
***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% or 10%; robust standard errors; † indicate a dummy variable 
The regression results for Model I support hypothesis 1 and reject hypothesis 2. Experience 
from previous innovation expenditure has a positive and significant impact on project 
selection based on economic factors. Performing R&D continuously has an additive effect. 
However, there is no such effect on the knowledge factor. The effect takes hold once we split 
innovation expenditure into R&D and later-stage innovation expenditure (Model II). As 
suggested in hypothesis 3a, the former represents R&D experience reflected in subsequent, 
knowledge-based selection while the latter generates market experience that is reflected in 
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economic project selection as suggested in hypothesis 3b. Interestingly, continuous R&D 
activities still only propel economic project selection. 
Two major patterns emerge from our results. First, total innovation expenditure, ie the sum 
of R&D expenditure and non-R&D expenditure as a share in total sales does not significantly 
affect the evaluation of projects based on knowledge factors. However, firms with high R&D 
expenditure in the past select projects based on these criteria (see table 3). Interestingly, the 
knowledge-based selection does not depend on continuous R&D engagements. Apparently, 
selecting projects based on knowledge criteria requires established technological knowledge 
stocks which are developed in-house. 
Second, non-R&D, later-stage innovation expenditure is reflected in project selection based 
on economic factors. Non-R&D innovation expenditure includes preparation for the market 
introduction of new products, acquisition of production machinery and existing, external 
knowledge such as licenses. Firms that spend a large part of their turnover on these types of 
activities are more likely to evaluate innovation projects based on economic criteria and 
commercialisation prospects than firms that spend less on non-R&D innovation. They are in a 
better position to assess costs and risks. This experience seems to help them to evaluate the 
economic value of future innovation projects. Accumulation and centralisation of these 
experiences through continuous R&D engagements, which are often associated with having a 
dedicated department, propel decision-making based on economic factors. 
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Table 3: Results of ordinary least-squares regression analysis on Model II (R&D 
and non-R&D innovation expenditure) 
 
Model II Economic factor Knowledge factor 
 Coef Std err Coef Std err 
Innovation expenditure as share of sales (t-1)     
Non-R&D expenditure as share of sale (t-1) 0.289*** 0.097 0.028 0.12 
R&D expenditure as share of sales (t-1) 0.154 0.142 0.229** 0.109 
Continuous R&D activity (t-1) † 0.054*** 0.021 0.025 0.017 
Share of employees with university degree (t-1) † 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
Part of company group† 0.007 0.018 0.015 0.015 
Location in eastern Germany† -0.037* 0.020 -0.051*** 0.016 
Share of exports in sales -0.119*** 0.041 -0.015 0.035 
No of employees (logs) -0.018** 0.008 0.013** 0.006 
Public funding for R&D† 0.070*** 0.021 -0.050*** 0.018 
Patent protection† -0.020 0.023 0.004 0.019 
Year 2005† -0.020 0.018 -0.069*** 0.014 
Medium high-tech manufacturing† 0.002 0.025 -0.006 0.020 
High-tech manufacturing† 0.012 0.038 -0.001 0.029 
Distributive services† -0.035 0.029 -0.024 0.023 
Knowledge-intensive services† 0.007 0.040 -0.033 0.033 
Technological services† -0.032 0.038 0.010 0.032 
Constant 0.635*** 0.038 0.340*** 0.031 
Number of observations  685  685 
F (16, 668) 4.54 (16, 668) 5.55 
Prob > F  0.00  0.00 
R2  0.08  0.10 
Root MSE  0.22  0.18 
***, **, * indicate significance of 1%, 5% or 10%; robust standard errors; † indicate a dummy variable 
We do not develop a priori hypothesis for control variables. Nevertheless, their estimated 
results are discussed briefly. The significant results for all variables remain stable for both 
Model I and Model II. With regard to project selection based on economic factors, we find 
that internationalisation has negative effects. The latter is typically associated with a firm’s 
growth strategies. As firms venture out of their home market environment, they experience 
certain unavoidable extra costs stemming from spatial distance (eg transportation, time 
zones), a lack of reputation and roots in the host market as well as possible export restrictions 
in the home market (Zaheer, 1995). These additional costs may be justified by realised or 
expected revenue increases from new markets and are therefore easier to accept in the project 
selection stage. The size of a firm, based on the number of employees, has a positive effect on 
the importance the firm attributes to knowledge-related factors when selecting innovation 
projects. In contrast, economic criteria in project selection are less important for large firms 
compared to small ones. We find the opposite effect for the knowledge factor. This may 
reflect the overall resource limitations of small firms and the resulting need to closely monitor 
economic factors. The same may be true for the recipients of public funding for their R&D 
activities. However, this resource limitation effect appears to have no additional regional 
dimension. Firms located in the economically challenged eastern part of Germany place 
significantly less importance on both economic and knowledge factors in selecting innovation 
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projects compared to their western German counterparts. We find no evidence of additional 
industry effects. 
Consistency check 
We conduct an additional consistency check. Given the close relationship between 
investments in innovation activities and the establishment of absorptive capacities, it is 
difficult to distinguish between the two “faces” of R&D (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), which 
is nevertheless relevant for our theoretical discussion because we base some of the discussion 
on this stream of literature. We address this issue in a separate regression model by 
distinguishing between the potential absorptive capacity and its actual usage, ie for the 
identification, assimilation and exploitation of external knowledge. The existing literature 
refers to these two stages as potential vs realised absorptive capacity (Jansen et al, 2005; 
Zahra and George, 2002). The latter is accounted for by dummy variables indicating whether 
the firm was actually able to rely strongly4 on external information sources and turn them into 
successful innovations. As suggested by Frost et al (2002), we cover four important sources: 
customers, suppliers, competitors and research institutions (universities).5 We find almost no 
significant support for the importance of realised absorptive capacity. All main effects remain 
stable. Full regression results are provided in Appendix D. 
                                                 
4  Firms were asked to rate the importance of external knowledge sources for successful innovation separately 
on a 4-point Likert scale (“not relevant” to “high”). The dummy variables are 1 if the firm indicated that the 
importance was high. 
5  Adding interaction effects between innovation expenditure and external innovation sources to the 
econometric model provided no additional, significant insights. Existing main effects remain stable. 
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6 Discussion 
We are conducting this study to obtain a better understanding of the learning effects from 
innovation engagements. More precisely, we ask: What does previous innovation experience 
tell firms about what not to do in the future? With that in mind, we focus on projects that did 
not materialise or were abandoned - an important building block for choosing and 
implementing the “right” projects. We suggest two major learning mechanisms to help firms 
to deal with the inherent uncertainty of innovation projects that forces them to build project 
portfolios and weed out the least promising. On the one hand, real options theory suggests a 
process based on financial data and that firms with previous experience in conducting 
innovation projects are better able to judge necessary funds, costs and risks. On the other 
hand, research on absorptive capacities finds that previous innovation experience translates 
into superior capabilities to value, extract and exploit external knowledge. We test both 
hypotheses empirically for a large dataset of German firms and over long periods of time. 
Our results indicate congruence between the firms’ innovation experience and their project 
selection patterns in the future. Extensive R&D experience materialises as knowledge stocks 
that enable firms to judge projects based on knowledge criteria. Non-R&D experience, 
however, stemming from producing and introducing products to markets, resonates as 
decision-making based on economic factors in the future.  Both stages of innovation activities 
appear to generate distinct decision-making capabilities inside the firm which are 
subsequently exploited in selecting projects for the future.  
Furthermore, our findings on the effects of continuous R&D engagements on project 
selection in the future may provide additional insights into how firms learn from R&D. We 
find that accumulating knowledge over time (ie conducting in-house R&D continuously) 
leads to project selection based on economic factors. This indicates that the value of R&D, 
though often associated with having a dedicated department as the nexus of a firm’s 
innovation activities, may not exclusively stem from knowledge retention and build-up. 
Equally important could be its role in re-evaluating existing knowledge after it has been 
market-tested and injecting this economic assessment of knowledge back into the innovation 
process. Furthermore, those firms continuously involved in in-house R&D will be better able 
to assess the real costs of a project and its market prospects vis-à-vis the innovation activities 
of their competitors. 
Important lessons can be drawn from our findings for both management and policy 
recommendations if the aim is to influence a firm’s project portfolios. For the former, this 
may imply a change in strategy while the latter may be interested in steering economic 
activities in new directions. We find that the type of previous innovation experience 
significantly influences portfolio management in the future. Firms may be led (through 
management) or lured (through policy instruments) in new directions. But this process is risky 
as firms will become less adept to judge projects outside of their established field of 
experience. Thus, a more long-term-oriented policy approach may be a more promising 
mechanism for changing a firm’s selection pattern.  
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7 Caveats and future research 
Our analysis has some limitations which may provide opportunities for future research. 
First, our empirical results are limited to the German context. It would be interesting to see 
comparative studies from other countries, especially from developing economies. Secondly, 
we benefit from an established survey with extensive coverage and quality management. 
However, the list of potential criteria for project selection is not exhaustive and somewhat 
driven by existing, available data. Dedicated surveys may provide additional insights. Finally, 
rejecting or cancelling a project may only be one basic element of a broad variety of 
management options. Firms may opt for deferring, recombining or reconfiguring existing 
projects which may also imply outsourcing them. A better understanding of these patterns and 
the effects of previous experience on their usage would certainly be a fruitful road for further 
academic investigation. 
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8 Appendix 
Appendix A: Industry breakdown 
Industry Group NACE Code Industry Group 
Food and tobacco 15 – 16 Other manufacturing 
Textiles  and leather 17 – 19 Other manufacturing 
Wood/paper/publishing 20 – 22 Other manufacturing 
Chemicals/petroleum  23 – 24 Medium high-tech manufacturing 
Plastics/rubber  25 Other manufacturing 
Glass/ceramics  26 Other manufacturing 
Metal  27 – 28 Other manufacturing 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 29 Medium high-tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of electrical equipment and 
electronics 
30 – 32 High-tech manufacturing 
Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 High-tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of motor vehicles 34 – 35 Medium high-tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of furniture, jewellery, sports 
equipment and toys 
36 – 37 Other manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water supply 40 – 41 Other manufacturing 
Construction 45 Other manufacturing 
Retail and motor trade 50, 52 Distributive services 
Wholesale trade 51 Distributive services 
Transportation and communication 60 – 63, 64.1 Distributive services 
Financial intermediation 65 – 67 Knowledge-intensive services 
Real estate activities and renting 70 – 71 Distributive services 
ICT services 72, 64.3 Technological services 
Technical services 73, 74.2, 74.3 Technological services 
Consulting 74.1, 74.4 Knowledge-intensive services 
Motion picture/broadcasting 92.1 – 92.2 Knowledge-intensive services 
Other business-oriented services 74.5 – 74.8, 90 Distributive services 
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Appendix B: Descriptive statistics 
 
Whole sample 
Knowledge 
factor above 
median 
Knowledge 
factor below 
median 
 Economic factor above median 
Economic 
factor below 
median 
 
Variable Mean Std dev Mean 
Std 
dev Mean 
Std 
dev  Mean 
Std 
dev Mean 
Stdd 
dev  
Innovation 
expenditure 
as share of 
sales (t-1) 
0.062 0.094 0.063 0.090 0.062 0.095  0.077 0.114 0.048 0.063 c
Non-R&D 
expenditure 
as share of 
sales (t-1) 
0.034 0.064 0.033 0.060 0.035 0.068  0.041 0.080 0.026 0.042 c
R&D 
expenditure 
as share of 
sales (t-1) 
0.029 0.060 0.030 0.060 0.063 0.097 c 0.035 0.072 0.022 0.044 c
Continuous 
R&D activity 
(t-1) 
0.603 0.490 0.641 0.480 0.564 0.497 c 0.640 0.481 0.565 0.496 c
Share of 
employees 
with 
university 
degree (t-1) 
19.47 21.53 18.19 20.07 20.74 22.87 c 22.03 23.25 16.83 19.30 c
Customers as 
crucial 
information 
source (t-1) 
0.215 0.411 0.204 0.403 0.225 0.418  0.231 0.422 0.198 0.399  
Suppliers as 
crucial 
information 
source (t-1) 
0.147 0.355 0.181 0.385 0.114 0.318 c 0.164 0.371 0.130 0.337  
Competitors 
as crucial 
information 
source (t-1) 
0.031 0.173 0.038 0.191 0.023 0.151  0.035 0.183 0.027 0.161  
Research 
facilities as 
crucial 
information 
source (t-1) 
0.095 0.293 0.096 0.295 0.094 0.292  0.124 0.330 0.065 0.247 c
Part of 
conglomerate 0.485 0.500 0.510 0.501 0.459 0.499 a 0.484 0.500 0.485 0.501  
Location in 
eastern 
Germany 
0.369 0.483 0.294 0.456 0.444 0.498 c 0.403 0.491 0.334 0.472 c
Share of 
exports of 
sales 
0.197 0.247 0.219 0.253 0.175 0.239 c 0.170 0.226 0.225 0.264 c
No of 
employees 
(logs) 
4.380 1.456 4.586 1.392 4.171 1.491 c 4.210 1.461 4.553 1.432 c
Public 
funding 0.291 0.454 0.242 0.430 0.339 0.474 c 0.357 0.480 0.222 0.416 c
Patent 
protection 0.324 0.468 0.356 0.479 0.292 0.456 c 0.303 0.460 0.346 0.476 a
Year 2005 0.523 0.500 0.437 0.497 0.608 0.489 c 0.519 0.500 0.527 0.500  
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Medium high-
tech 
manufacturin
g 
0.213 0.410 0.220 0.414 0.208 0.406  0.190 0.393 0.237 0.426 b
High-tech 
manufacturin
g 
0.073 0.260 0.082 0.274 0.064 0.247  0.086 0.281 0.059 0.236 a
Distributive 
services 0.124 0.330 0.096 0.295 0.152 0.360 c 0.107 0.309 0.142 0.350 b
Knowledge-
intensive 
services 
0.057 0.232 0.044 0.205 0.070 0.256 b 0.058 0.233 0.056 0.231  
Technological 
services 0.109 0.312 0.099 0.299 0.120 0.325  0.130 0.336 0.089 0.285 b
Knowledge 
factor 0.348 0.183 0.497 0.120 0.199 0.092 c 0.347 0.181 0.348 0.186  
Economic 
factor 0.578 0.225 0.590 0.189 0.565 0.255 c 0.761 0.105 0.389 0.144 c
No of 
Observations 6858 343 342  347 338  
Notes: a, b and c indicate significant differences of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, in means of the below-
median and above-median subsamples; the “abovemedian” group includes the median firms. In the case of the 
knowledge factors, there are 12 median firms, for economic factors 8. 
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Appendix C: Correlation matrix and variance inflation factors of the regressors 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) 
Non-R&D expenditure as share of 
sales (t-1) 
1.00   
 
(2) 
R&D expenditure as share of sales 
(t-1) 
0.13 1.00   
 
(3) Continuous R&D activity (t-1) 0.00 0.24 1.00    
(4) 
Share of employees with 
university degree (t-1) 
0.03 0.37 0.15 1.00   
 
(5) Part of conglomerate -0.06 -0.09 0.12 -0.05 1.00    
(6) Location in eastern Germany 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.25 -0.11 1.00   
(7) Share of exports of sales -0.07 0.10 0.32 -0.09 0.20 -0.28 1.00  
(8) No of employees (logs) -0.12 -0.12 0.28 -0.26 0.32 -0.19 0.35 1.00 
(9) Public funding 0.13 0.38 0.34 0.27 -0.04 0.32 0.09 0.05 1.00
(10) Patent protection -0.06 0.27 0.38 0.06 0.14 -0.14 0.39 0.33 0.24 1.00
(11) Year 2005 -0.02 0.05 -0.12 0.03 0.23 0.01 -0.06 -0.15 -0.05 -0.09
(12) Medium high-tech manufacturing -0.03 0.07 0.24 -0.03 0.09 -0.07 0.41 0.17 0.12 0.33
(13) High-tech manufacturing 0.00 0.27 0.17 0.18 -0.04 -0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.09 0.18
(14) Distributive services -0.07 -0.15 -0.23 -0.10 -0.02 0.06 -0.22 -0.09 -0.15 -0.17
(15) Knowledge-intensive services -0.06 -0.06 -0.14 0.07 -0.12 -0.01 -0.17 -0.06 -0.07 -0.14
(16) Technological services 0.09 0.21 -0.02 0.59 0.01 0.16 -0.21 -0.29 0.06 -0.07
 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 1.06 1.39 1.46 2.13 1.26 1.34 1.55 1.54 1.4 1.55
 Variable (11) (12) (13) (14 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(11) Year 2005 1.00    
(12) Medium high-tech manufacturing -0.05 1.00    
(13) High-tech manufacturing -0.02 -0.15 1.00    
(14) Distributive services 0.15 -0.20 -0.11 1.00    
(15) Knowledge-intensive services -0.04 -0.13 -0.07 -0.09 1.00    
(16) Technological services 0.09 -0.18 -0.10 -0.13 -0.09 1.00   
 VIF 1.12 1.45 1.4 1.28 1.21 2.18   
 Mean VIF 1.46    
Appendix D: Results of ordinary least-squares regression analysis on Model II including 
variables on realised absorptive capacity 
 
Model II Economic factor Knowledge factor 
 Coef Std err Coef Std err 
Innovation expenditure as share of sales (t-1)     
Non-R&D expenditure as share of sale (t-1) 0.310*** 0.097 0.022 0.117 
R&D expenditure as share of sales (t-1) 0.154 0.146 0235 0.109 
Continuous R&D activity (t-1) † 0.054 0.022 0.017 0.018 
Share of employees with university degree (t-1) † 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
Customers as crucial information source (t-1) † -0.013 0.023 0.007 0.018 
Suppliers as crucial information source (t-1) † -0.005 0.026 0.043* 0.021 
Competitors as crucial information source (t-1) † -0.031 0.048 0.025 0.043 
Research facilities as crucial information source (t-1) † 0.049* 0.028 0.006 0.022 
Part of conglomerate† 0.007 0.018 0.015 0.015 
Location in eastern Germany† -0.038* 0.020 -0.051 0.016 
Share of exports in sales -0.122 0.041 -0.015 0.035 
No of employees (logs) -0.016 0.008 0.012 0.006 
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Model II Economic factor Knowledge factor 
 Coef Std err Coef Std err 
Public funding† 0.065 0.021 -0.055 0.018 
Patent protection† -0.024 0.023 0.007 0.019 
Year 2005† -0.016 0.019 -0.068 0.015 
Medium high-tech manufacturing† 0.003 0.025 -0.007 0.020 
High-tech manufacturing† 0.011 0.038 -0.007 0.029 
Distributive services† -0.037 0.029 -0.024 0.023 
Knowledge-intensive services† 0.008 0.04 -0.029 0.033 
Technological services† -0.031 0.038 0.009 0.032 
Constant 0.631*** 0.039 0.337 0.031 
Number of observations  685  685 
F (20, 664) 3.84 (20, 664) 4.42 
Prob > F  0.00  0.00 
R2  0.09  0.11 
Root MSE  0.22  0.18 
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